Figure: Air Illinois 710, from Aviation Safety Net

Eddie Sez:

Captain's who tend to fly by their own rules also tend to get angry with first officers who are afraid to be assertive. These captains, unfortunately, tend to be paired with weak first officers by choice and the result is predictable.

What follows are quotes from the relevant regulatory documents, listed below, as well as my comments in blue.


Accident Report


Narrative

[NTSB AAR-85-03, ¶1.1.]


Analysis

[NTSB AAR-85/03, ¶2]


Findings

[NTSB AAR-85/03, ¶3.1]


Probable Cause

[NTSB AAR-85/03, ¶3.2] The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the captain's decision to continue the flight toward the more distant destination airport after the loss of d.c. electrical power from both airplane generators instead of returning to the nearby departure airport. The captain's decision was adversely affected by self-imposed psychological factors which led him to assess inadequately the airplane's battery endurance after the loss of generator power and the magnitude of the risks involved in continuing to the destination airport. Contributing to the accident was the airline management's failure to provide and the FAA's failure to assure an adequate company recurrent flightcrew training program which contributed to the captain's inability to assess properly the battery endurance of the airplane before making the decision to continue, and led to the inability of the captain and the first officer to cope promptly and correctly with the airplane's electrical malfunction.


See Also

Pilot Psychology / Safety > Comfort > Reliability

Procedures & Techniques / Crew Resource Management


References

NTSB Aircraft Accident Report, AAR-85/03, Air Illinois Hawker Siddley HS 748-2A, N748LL, Near Pinckeyville, Illinois,, October 11, 1983