Figure: N215AA, from "Pressing the Approach", pg. 28.

Eddie Sez:

The crew on this MD-82 were highly qualified and accomplished. The captain was an Air Force veteran and a highly experienced check airman with American Airlines. His record was enviable. The first officer was new to American Airlines but was a Navy veteran with a good record. And yet they made a series of foolish mistakes that I am sure neither would have made the day before or the day after. What happened?

The NTSB report cited the crew's failure to abandon the approach and failure to arm the automatic ground spoilers. The crosswinds were above their company's stated maximum for a wet runway. At one point the captain said, "I hate droning around visual at night in weather without, having some clue where I am." No doubt about it, the approach should have been abandoned. Why did they start the approach, why did they continue the approach, and why didn't they go around and divert?

Experienced pilots know the reason: get-there-itis. We all have a mission-oriented instinct to get to our destination. It is, after all, our job.

This airline crew had that schedule pressure and I am told it was ingrained in many American Airlines pilots at the time. I am also told that culture has changed.

As corporate pilots, we are subjected to get-there-itis on steroids. We often know our passengers by name and know that getting them to their destination is good for them, good for the company, and good for us. If an airline pilot diverts, his next load of passengers are unlikely to be the same or to have any idea about what happened on the previous flight. We will see our passengers again.

As this mishap illustrates, get-there-itis worsens with fatigue. When we are tired, we may be unable to determine if our judgement is compromised by get-there-itis. Fortunately, we do have a cut and dried barometer of our performance that can provide a wake up call prior to a bad situation getting worse.

When you are performing up to standards, you expect to bring the airplane to a point 500 feet above the runway when in visual conditions or 1,000 feet above when in instrument conditions, on speed, on course, in a stable condition ready to land. If you somehow failed to do that, something went wrong and it might have been you.

If you are ever tempted to continue an approach which fails Stabilized Approach criteria, you might consider that you, a highly qualified and proficient pilot, somehow got the airplane into a situation it should not be. Perhaps your judgement is fatigue-impaired and you shouldn't be attempting to save a bad approach. Take it around and try it again.

What follows is from the relevant accident reports and other documents, listed below, as well as my comments in blue.


Accident Report


Narrative

Figure: Flight 1420's Approach Path, from NTSB Report, Figure 1.

[NTSB Report, pg. 1]

  • Flight 1420, from Dallas/Fort Worth to Little Rock, was scheduled to depart about 2028 and arrive about 2141. However, before its arrival at Dallas/Fort Worth, the flight crew received an aircraft communication addressing and reporting system (ACARS) message indicating a delayed departure time of 2100 for flight 1420. After deplaning from flight 2080, the flight crew proceeded to the departure gate for flight 1420. The flight crew then received trip paperwork for the flight, which included an American Airlines weather advisory for a widely scattered area of thunderstorms along he planned route and two National Weather Service (NWS) in-flight weather advisories for an area of severe thunderstorms4 along the planned route.

  • The airplane originally intended to be used for the flight was delayed in its arrival to Dallas/Fort Worth because of the adverse weather in the area. After 2100, the first officer notified gate agents that flight 1420 would need to depart by 2316 because of American’s company duty time limitation. The first officer then telephoned the flight dispatcher to suggest that he get another airplane for the flight or cancel it. Afterward, the accident airplane, N215AA, was substituted for flight 1420. The flight’s 2240 departure time was 2 hours 12 minutes later than the scheduled departure time. The captain was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the nonflying pilot.

  • About 2254, the flight dispatcher sent the flight crew an ACARS message indicating that the weather around Little Rock might be a factor during the arrival. The dispatcher suggested that the flight crew expedite the arrival to beat the thunderstorms if possible, and the flight crew acknowledged this message. The first officer indicated, in a postaccident interview, that “there was no discussion of delaying or diverting the landing” because of the weather. According to the predeparture trip paperwork, two alternate airports—Nashville International Airport, Tennessee, and Dallas/Fort Worth— were specified as options in case a diversion was needed.

  • Beginning about 2258, flight 1420 was handled by controllers from the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). About 2304, the Fort Worth center broadcast NWS Convective SIGMET [significant meteorological information] weather advisory 15C for an area of severe thunderstorms that included the Little Rock airport area. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicated that the flight crew had discussed the weather and the need to expedite the approach. At 2325:47, the captain stated, “we got to get over there quick.” About 5 seconds later, the first officer said, “I don’t like that...that’s lightning,” to which the captain replied, “sure is.” The CVR also indicated that the flight crew had the city of Little Rock and the airport area in sight by at 2326:59.

  • About 2327, the Fort Worth center cleared the flight to descend to 10,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and provided an altimeter setting of 29.86 inches of mercury (Hg). The flight was transferred about 2328 to the Memphis ARTCC, which provided the same altimeter setting.

  • According to the CVR, the flight crew contacted the Little Rock Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) at 2334:05. The controller advised the flight crew that a thunderstorm located northwest of the airport was moving through the area and that the wind was 280o at 28 knots gusting to 44 knots. The first officer told the controller that he and the captain could see the lightning. The controller told the flight crew to expect an ILS approach to runway 22L. The first officer indicated in a postaccident interview that, during the descent into the terminal area, the weather appeared to be about 15 miles away from the airport and that he and the captain thought that there was “some time” to make the approach.

  • The CVR indicated that, between at 2336:04 and at 2336:13, the captain and first officer discussed American Airlines’ crosswind limitation for landing. The captain indicated that 30 knots was the crosswind limitation but realized that he had provided the limitation for a dry runway. The captain then stated that the wet runway crosswind limitation was 20 knots, but the first officer stated that the limitation was 25 knots. In testimony at the National Transportation Safety Board’s public hearing on this accident, the first officer stated that neither he nor the captain checked the actual crosswind limitation in American’s flight manual. The first officer testified that he had taken the manual out but that the captain had signaled him to put the manual away because the captain was confident that the crosswind limitation was 20 knots.
  • The captain was correct.

  • At 2339:00, the controller cleared the flight to descend to an altitude of 3,000 feet msl. The controller then asked the flight crew about the weather conditions along the runway 22L final approach course, stating his belief that the airplane’s weather radar was “a lot better” than the weather radar depiction available in the tower. At 2339:12, the first officer stated, “okay, we can...see the airport from here. We can barely make it out but we should be able to make [runway] two two...that storm is moving this way like your radar says it is but a little bit farther off than you thought.” The controller then offered flight 1420 a visual approach to the runway, but the first officer indicated, “at this point, we really can’t make it out. We’re gonna have to stay with you as long as possible.”

  • At 2339:45, the controller notified flight 1420 of a windshear alert, reporting that the centerfield wind was 340° at 10 knots, the north boundary wind was 330° at 25 knots, and the northwest boundary wind was 010° at 15 knots. The flight crew then requested runway 4R so that there would be a headwind, rather than a tailwind, during landing. At 2340:20, the controller instructed the flight crew to fly a heading of 250° for vectors to the runway 4R ILS final approach course. After reaching the assigned heading, the airplane was turned away from the airport and clear of the thunderstorm that had previously been reported by the controller. The CVR indicated that, between 2340:46 and 2341:31, the first officer stated the localizer frequency and course, the decision altitude, the minimum safe altitude, and a portion of the missed approach procedure for runway 4R.

  • Between 2342:19 and 2342:24, the CVR indicated that the captain asked the first officer, “do you have the airport? Is that it right there? I don’t see a runway.” At 2342:27, the controller told the flight crew that the second part of the thunderstorm was apparently moving through the area and that the winds were 340° at 16 knots gusting to 34 knots. At 2342:40, the first officer asked the captain whether he wanted to accept “a short approach” and “keep it in tight.” The captain answered, “yeah, if you see the runway. ‘cause I don’t quite see it.” The first officer stated, “yeah, it’s right here, see it?” The captain replied, “you just point me in the right direction and I’ll start slowing down here.” At 2342:55, the first officer said, “it’s going right over the...field.” At 2342:59, the first officer told the controller, “well we got the airport. We’re going between clouds. I think it’s right off my, uh, three o’clock low, about four miles.” The controller then offered a visual approach for runway 4R, and the first officer accepted. At 2343:11, the controller cleared flight 1420 for a visual approach to runway 4R and indicated “if you lose it, need some help, let me know please.”

  • At 2343:35, the first officer stated, “you’re comin’ in. There’s the airport.” Three seconds later, the captain stated, “uh, I lost it,” to which the first officer replied, “see it’s right there.” The captain then stated, “I still don’t see it...just vector me. I don’t know.” At 2343:59, the controller cleared flight 1420 to land and indicated that the winds were 330° at 21 knots. At 2344:19, the captain stated, “see we’re losing it. I don’t think we can maintain visual.” At 2344:30, the first officer informed the controller that visual contact with the airport had been lost because of a cloud between the airplane and the airport. The controller then cleared the airplane to fly a heading of 220° for radar vectors for the ILS approach to runway 4R and directed the flight to descend to and maintain 2,300 feet msl.

[NTSB Report, pg. 204 (CVR)]

  • 1145:15 CAM-1: I hate droning around visual at night in weather without, having some clue where I am.

  • 1145:23 CAM-2: Yeah but, the longer we go out her . . .

  • 1145:24 CAM-1: Yeah, I know.

The captain was obviously uncomfortable but appeared unwilling to call "knock it off" with the first officer being so willing to press on.

[NTSB Report, pg. 4]

  • At 2345:47, the first officer told the controller “we’re getting pretty close to this storm. we’ll keep it tight if we have to.” The controller indicated to the flight crew that, “when you join the final, you’re going to be right at just a little bit outside the marker if that’s gonna be okay for ya.” The captain stated, “that’s great,” and the first officer told the controller, “that’s great with us.” At 2346:39, the controller advised the flight crew that the airplane was 3 miles from the outer marker.

  • At 2346:52, the captain stated, “aw, we’re goin’ right into this.” At the same time, the controller reported that there was heavy rain at the airport, the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information in effect at the time was no longer current, the visibility was less than 1 mile, and the runway visual range (RVR)15 for runway 4R was 3,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged this information. At 2347:08, the controller again cleared flight 1420 to land and indicated that the wind was 350° at 30 knots gusting to 45 knots. The first officer then read back the wind information as 030° at 45 knots. At 2347:22, the captain stated, “three thousand RVR. We can’t land on that.” Four seconds later, the first officer indicated that the RVR for runway 4R was 2,400 feet, and the captain then said, “okay, fine.”

  • At 2347:44, the captain stated, “landing gear down,” and the CVR recorded a sound consistent with the landing gear being operated. About 5 seconds later, the captain stated, “and lights please.” At 2347:53, the controller issued a second windshear alert for the airport, reporting that the centerfield wind was 350° at 32 knots gusting to 45 knots, the north boundary wind was 310° at 29 knots, and the northeast boundary wind was 320° at 32 knots. This transmission was not acknowledged by the flight crew. At 2348:10, the captain stated, “add twenty [knots],” to which the first officer replied, “right.”

  • At 2348:12, the controller reported that the runway 4R RVR was now 1,600 feet. About 2348:18, the captain indicated that the flight was established on final approach; 6 seconds later, the first officer informed the controller that the flight was established on the inbound portion of the ILS. The controller repeated the clearance to land; stated that the wind was 340° at 31 knots, the north boundary wind was 300° at 26 knots, and the northeast boundary wind was 320o at 25 knots; and repeated the RVR. At 2348:41, the first officer acknowledged this information. The controller did not receive any further transmissions from flight 1420. At 2349:02, the first officer asked the captain, “want forty flaps?” The captain indicated that he thought he had already called for the landing flaps, after which the first officer stated, “forty now.” At 2349:10, the controller informed the flight crew that the wind was 330° at 28 knots. Two seconds later, the captain stated, “this is a can of worms.”
  • That statement should have intuitively told both pilots it was time to go around.

  • According to the CVR, the first officer stated, “there’s the runway off to your right, got it?” at 2349:24. The captain replied, “no,” to which the first officer stated, “I got the runway in sight. You’re right on course. Stay where you’re at.” The captain then stated, “I got it. I got it.” At 2349:32, the controller reported the wind to be 330° at 25 knots. At 2349:37, an unidentified voice in the cockpit stated, “wipers,” and the CVR then recorded a sound consistent with windshield wiper motion. (This sound continued throughout the rest of the flight.) At 2349:53, the controller reported the wind to be 320° at 23 knots.

  • The CVR indicated that, at 2349:57, an unidentified voice in the cockpit stated, “aw...we’re off course” and that, 1 second later, an unintelligible comment was made by an unidentified voice in the cockpit. In a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that he thought the approach was stabilized until about 400 feet above field level (afl), at which point the airplane drifted to the right. The first officer also stated that he said “go around” about that time but not in a very strong voice. The first officer indicated that he had looked at the captain to see if he had heard him but that the captain was intent on flying and was doing “a good job.”
  • The "off course" should have been a cue to go around. The actual go around call should have been made more assertively and when not executed, should have been repeated.

  • The CVR indicated that, at 2350:00, the first officer said, “we’re way off.” Flight data recorder (FDR) information indicated that the localizer deviation value was about one dot to the right at that point. About 1 second later, the captain stated, “I can’t see it.” About 3 seconds afterward, the first officer asked, “got it?” to which the captain replied, “yeah I got it.” At 2350:13 and :14, the CVR recorded the sound of the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) radio altitude callout “sink rate.” Calculations based on FDR data indicated that the airplane was descending through an altitude of about 70 feet afl at the time of the first sink rate warning and about 50 feet afl at the time of the second warning. Figure 1 shows flight 1420’s flightpath to Little Rock and runway 4R along with key CVR comments and the airplane’s location when the comments were made.

  • FDR and CVR data indicated that the airplane touched down on the runway about 2350:20. About 2350:22, the first officer stated “we’re down;” about 2 seconds later, he stated, “we’re sliding.” FDR data also indicated that, over a 7-second period after touchdown, both thrust reversers were deployed and the left and right engines’ engine pressure ratios (EPR) reached settings of 1.89 and 1.67, respectively. The thrust reversers were subsequently moved to the unlocked status (neither deployed nor stowed). According to the FDR, the flight spoilers did not deploy symmetrically at touchdown, but a momentary 8° deflection of the left outboard flight spoiler concurrent with a left aileron deflection was recorded.

  • FDR data indicated that the right and left brake pedals began to move at 2350:25 and :30, respectively, and both pedals reached full travel at 2350:31. About the time that the brakes were applied, the thrust reversers were deployed again. At 2350:32, the CVR recorded an unidentified voice in the cockpit stating “on the brakes.” The left engine reached a maximum setting of 1.98 reverse EPR, and the right engine reached a setting of 1.64 reverse EPR. The left brake pedal was relaxed at 2350:34 before returning to its full position 2 seconds later. About the time that the left brake pedal was relaxed, the reversers were returned to the unlocked status. As the right thrust reverser was being moved to the unlocked status, the right engine reached a maximum setting of 1.74 reverse EPR.

  • At 2350:36, FDR data indicated a full 60° deployment of the right inboard flight spoiler, concurrent with a full aileron deflection. At 2350:40, the left thrust reverser was moved back to the deployed position, but the right reverser moved briefly to the deployed position and then moved to the stowed position. According to FDR data, the left thrust reverser remained deployed, and the right thrust reverser remained stowed, for the remainder of the flight. About 1 second later, the CVR recorded expletives stated by an unidentified voice in the cockpit, which were followed by the sounds of initial impact at 2350:44 and several additional impacts beginning at 2350:47. The CVR stopped recording at 2350:48. The airplane came to rest about 800 feet from the departure end of runway 4R, 34° 44.18 minutes north latitude and 92° 11.97 minutes west longitude. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness.

Analysis

[NTSB Report, ¶1.17.4.4] 1.17.4.4 Use of Reverse Thrust

[NTSB Report, ¶1.18.3.2] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Study on Flight Crew Decision Errors

[NTSB Report, ¶2.2.1.4] Summary of the Flight Crew’s Performance During the Approach

[NTSB Report, ¶2.2.2.2.] American’s DC-9 Operating Manual indicated that, for landings on slippery runways, pilots were not to exceed 1.3 EPR on the “slippery portions of the runway” except in an emergency situation. Likewise, Boeing’s MD-80 FCOM indicated that reverse thrust of no more than 1.3 EPR should be used on wet or contaminated runways, except in an emergency. However, FDR evidence indicated that reverse thrust exceeded 1.3 EPR several times during flight 1420’s landing sequence.199 Further, American’s and Boeing’s maximum reverse thrust setting for landings on dry runways was 1.6 EPR, and FDR data showed that even this setting was exceeded many times during the landing.

[NTSB Report, ¶2.2.2.4.] The Safety Board’s Airplane Performance Study indicated that the accident airplane could have stopped about 700 feet before the end of the runway if the spoilers had deployed, a constant symmetrical reverse thrust at 1.3 EPR had been maintained, and the flight 1420 manual braking profile had been applied. In contrast, with the spoilers not extended, the airplane could not have stopped within the remaining runway length even if maximum manual braking had been applied immediately after touchdown and symmetrical reverse thrust at 1.3 EPR had been maintained throughout the landing roll. Thus, the Safety Board concludes that the lack of spoiler deployment was the single most important factor in the flight crew’s inability to stop the accident airplane within the available runway length.


Probable Cause

[NTSB Report, ¶3.2] The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the flight crew’s failure to discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms and their associated hazards to flight operations had moved into the airport area and the crew’s failure to ensure that the spoilers had extended after touchdown.

Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s (1) impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances, (2) continuation of the approach to a landing when the company’s maximum crosswind component was exceeded, and (3) use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing.


See Also

Normal Procedures & Techniques / Decision Making

Normal Procedures & Techniques / Stabilized Approach


References

Aviation Safety Network

"MD-82 Overruns Runway While Landing in Proximity of Severe Thunderstorms," Flight Safety Foundation, Accident Prevention, Vol. 59 No. 2, February 2002

"Pressing the Approach," Flight Safety Foundation, December 2006

May Day: Racing the Storm, Cineflix, Episode 2, Season 1, 3 September 2003 (American Airlines 1420)

NTSB Aircraft Accident Report, AAR-01/02, Runway Overrun During Landing, American Airlines Flight 1420, McDonnell Douglas MD-82, N215AA, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 1, 1999