HS-125 N831LC and LR-35A N30DK

I am flying a 135 charter flight out of SDM (Brown Field) at night near San Diego in a few days. Ingrained in my memory is the crash that killed members of Reba McEntire’s band on March 16, 1991. As a 40 year resident of San Diego I remember the crew flew into a mountain east of SDM.

I can’t find the details to my satisfaction in the NTSB database as it is now apparently on microfiche.

As I recall, the crew called LA Center on departure and were told RADAR contact, cleared on course, which they took as cleared direct to the first fix, and they hit the hills. I understand we are the final authority on safety at all times. However, my understanding is that if LA Center had said RADAR contact, then given a vector, LA Center would be responsible for terrain separation at that point. Again, I understand we are responsible for separation as PIC ultimately, but here are my 2 questions:

1. Is my memory of what happened correct?
2. When and only when on a vector, not cleared direct to a fix, nor cleared on course, is it now ATC’s responsibility to keep the aircraft clear of terrain in this case with this crew.

Thanks!

A few minutes before the takeoff, Holms, who was not familiar with the San Diego area, twice radioed a nearby FAA flight service station, asking the specialist there whether there were unique departure instructions for pilots taking off from Brown, according to a transcript released by the NTSB. Flight service specialists advise pilots on flight plans but do not serve as air traffic controllers.

The same specialist, who has not been identified, answered both calls, but despite the conversations that ensued, Holms apparently remained uncertain about the instructions. He called a a third time, reminding the specialist that he would be flying under visual flight rules.

During his third conversation with the specialist, Holms complained that the instructions he was getting from the specialist would force him to fly “right into the TCA without a clearance,” according to the transcript.

“That’s right. Yeah, that’s right,” the specialist said.

“So, I would be better off if I headed . . . northeast and stayed down, say down below three thousand (feet). . . . Do you agree on that?” Holms asked.

“Yeah. Sure. That’ll be fine,” the specialist said.

The transcript indicated that the specialist never mentioned the mountainous terrain, and FAA officials said it was Holms’ responsibility, flying under visual flight rules, to know where the mountain was.

Source: Pilots and FAA Faulted in Crash That Killed Singer’s Band, by Eric Malnic, Sept. 15, 1992 12 AM PT

At about 1:45 a.m., a few minutes after takeoff, the jet was flying at 3,300 feet when the left wing clipped an outcropping of 3,500-foot Otay Mountain, sending it cartwheeling into the rocky peak with a massive explosion.”

Source: The Devastating Plane Crash that Killed Reba McEntire's Band, Tim Ott Updated: Dec 15, 2020 Original: Oct 30, 2019

Factors related to the accident were insufficient terrain information provided by the (FAA) flight service specialist . . . after the pilot inquired about a low-altitude departure; darkness; mountainous terrain; both pilots’ lack of familiarity with the geographical area, and the co-pilot’s lack of familiarity with the aircraft,” the NTSB said.

Source: Pilots and FAA Faulted in Crash That Killed Singer’s Band, by Eric Malnic, Sept. 15, 1992 12 AM PT

“…the heading issued by the controller resulted in a flight track that continued toward the mountains.”

Source: NTSB LAX05FA015

"The airplane departed under VFR at night and was being handled by an air traffic controller when it crashed into terrain at the 2,256-foot level of a mountain that was located 8 nm east of SDM. The initial impact was about 100 feet below the base of an overcast cloud layer. The flight crew decided to depart under VFR from runway 8L after unsuccessful attempts to obtain an IFR clearance using the communication radios. The flight crew did not attempt to obtain the IFR clearance by telephone, even though they had cellular and satellite telephones on board the airplane.”

Source: NTSB LAX05FA015

"NOTE− Pilots of pop−up aircraft are responsible for terrain and obstacle clearance until reaching minimum instrument altitude (MIA) or minimum en route altitude (MEA). Pilot compliance with an approved FAA procedure or an ATC instruction transfers that responsibility to the FAA; therefore, do not assign (or imply) specific course guidance that will (or could) be in effect below the MIA or MEA.""

Source: FAA JO 7110.65Z, Air Traffic Control, 6/17/21 4-2-8 (d)(1)

"Although the flight crew is responsible for maintaining terrain clearance while operating under VFR, FAA Order 7110.65P, chapter 4-2-8, states that, when an aircraft is operating under VFR below minimum IFR altitudes and the flight crew requests an IFR clearance, the controller should ask the crewmembers if they would be able to maintain terrain and obstruction clearance during the climb to the minimum IFR altitude. The order also states that, if the controller provides an instruction (such as turn to a heading of 020 ), the responsibility for terrain clearance is transferred to the FAA. The order advises controllers not to “assign (or imply) specific course guidance that will (or could) be in effect below the MIA or MEA.” During a postaccident interview, the controller stated he was unaware of this responsibility.

Regardless of his failure to appropriately apply the procedures for handling a VFR-IFR flight, the controller was aware of the topography near SDM and that the airplane was quickly approaching a mountainous area; thus, he should have taken action to alert the flight crew. The controller’s explanation that he was not required to monitor or provide terrain clearance assistance to a VFR flight is contrary to the primary purposes of ATC, which are to prevent a collision and to remain vigilant for situations that warrant the issuance of alerts to flight crews regarding hazardous proximity to terrain, obstacles, and other aircraft. The controller’s apparent perception that flight crews operating under VFR are always able to avoid terrain and obstacles regardless of flight conditions is incorrect, and his failure to take appropriate action placed the airplane in an unsafe situation. The controller had the knowledge and opportunity to alert the flight crew to an unsafe condition, but he failed to do so."

Source: NTSB LAX05FA015

IMPROPER PLANNING/DECISION BY THE PILOT, THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN PROPER ALTITUDE AND CLEARANCE OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN, AND THE COPILOT'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF THE FLIGHT. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: INSUFFICIENT TERRAIN INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE FLIGHT SERVICE SPECIALIST DURING THE PREFLIGHT BRIEFING AFTER THE PILOT INQUIRED ABOUT A LOW ALTITUDE DEPARTURE, DARKNESS, MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN, BOTH PILOT'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, AND THE COPILOT'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE AIRCRAFT.

Source: NTSB LAX91FA132

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flight crew to maintain terrain clearance during a VFR departure, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain and the air traffic controller’s issuance of a clearance that transferred the responsibility for terrain clearance from the flight crew to the controller, failure to provide terrain clearance instructions to the flight crew, and failure to advise the flight crew of the MSAW alerts. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ fatigue, which likely contributed to their degraded decision-making.

Source: NTSB LAX05FA015