RC-135S 61-2664

61-2664 at Shemya, Paul Jeanes

When I first read the accident report it was classified because of the mission of the airplane. The full report left me thinking, at the time, this was a case of pilot error, plain and simple. Then we started hearing that the pilot had a long history of ducking under glide paths at previous assignments, but never documented in official check rides. So the new emphasis was to require training records follow pilots. And that, apparently, was that.

I failed to realize the real problem until years later. I was flying an EC-135J when I first read the full report. The EC-135J has the same engines, the same brakes, and weighs about the same. Our approach speeds were similar. Many of our pilots were well-practiced at the art of aiming for landing on the first inch of a runway, and it was a practice that was encouraged. After the crash there was a renewed emphasis to land in the touchdown zone, but years later many pilots were right back to what we called "brick one." I came to conclusion this pilot was just flying has he had been trained. His safety margins were reduced, but he got away with it until he didn't. There is a lesson here for us all.

At the time, an AF team went around to several bases to say this pilot had a long history of doing the duck under, but the redacted report doesn't say that. It could be that this pilot just got suckered in by the visibility and wasn't trying to duck under the glide path. But he seemed to tolerate the "below glide path" calls without an aggressive move to correct. I've flown with several RC-135 pilots over the years who say the squadron did not allow the "duck under" before and after this crash but that now and then a pilot or two would start doing them again. Leadership is key. If those at top say don't duck under and take action against those who do, the practice will stop.

1 — Accident report

2 — Narrative

3 — Analysis

4 — Cause

5 — Postscript

• Date: 15 March 1981
• Time: 2136 BST
• Type: RC-135S
• Operator: 6th Strategic Wing, Strategic Air Command
• Registration: 61-2664
• Fatalities: 6 of 24 crew, 0 of 0 passengers
• Aircraft fate: Destroyed
• Phase: Approach
• Airport (departure): Eielson AFB, AK (PAEI)
• Airport (arrival): Shemya AFB, AK (PASY)

The aircraft did not have a Flight Data Recorder or a Cockpit Voice Recorder, but there were tapes of the Ground Control Approach (GCA) controller during the Precision Approach Radar (PAR) approach. The copy of the report I got through the Freedom of Information Act is heavily redacted. There are no redactions shown here because the pages I am quoting were unedited. But there were many pages missing.

I read the full report back in 1984 and remember the conclusion that the pilot was prone to flying the PAR at a given descent rate, hence his tendency to fly below glide path when in a strong headwind. But that doesn't make sense given he had flown into Shemya many times before and those kinds of winds were not uncommon. Then, a year or so after the report was released, there was an Air Force wide message saying training records from one base should be forwarded to the next base. I was flying a version of the same aircraft that had about the same approach weight and speeds and we were given several briefings about the crash and special emphasis on the PAR. We were told that this particular pilot had a tendency to fly below glide path, but that was never documented in his check rides and training records from his previous assignments had never been forwarded. There is much to speculate about here because either the report didn't go into the human factors or that part of the report was redacted. I'm not sure. So the analysis that follows is mine, not the report's.

PAR Record

Final Approach Diagram, Mishap Report, p. R-1

The drawing of the scope shows what the GCA (Ground Control Approach) controller would have seen. The top portion shows radar paint of the aircraft against an ideal 3° glide path, the bottom portion shows azimuth. The pilot's glide path control tended to be below glide path, though he did correct and slightly over-correct at one point. The "sir, we've got the lights" call was made after a slightly below glide path call but on the scope while well below. They were well below glide path when crossing the landing threshold.

There are several human factors issues involved that will not be apparent to someone who has never flown this type of Boeing 707, who has not flown into Shemya, has not flown this kind of mission where the airplane is filled with fellow crewmembers who want to get on the ground to get their week started.

• Landing at Shemya required a lot of extra fuel, since the nearest alternate was hours away, and even further away for the RC-135S which was a "secret" bird that could not land at bases where it could be easily seen by the public. The airplane's normal approach speed was fast, even faster at Shemya.
• The airplane was just barely up to the task of stopping on that amount of runway with any contamination. The brakes were prone to overheating and when that happened the tires were prone to exploding.
• The C-135 community, and much of the "heavy community" in the Air Force at the time did not place a high priority on landing in the touchdown zone. Some units actually encouraged pilots to not only aim for 500' down the runway but to touchdown there as well. Some pilots aimed for the first inch of the runway with the intent of flaring to the 500' point.
• The "brick one" idea is widely discredited, but the dirty little secret is that it actually works given enough practice and proficiency. If a squadron is filled with pilots who can do it well, there is a lot of pressure on the other pilots to follow. The problem with the practice, however, is that on a day where there are visual obscurations, shifting winds, or pilot fatigue, the practice can end up with a very early touchdown.
• The practice of flying a fairly long and intense training mission prior to a PAR landing at Shemya was thought of as good training for a wartime mission. The aircraft did have a very important wartime role during the cold war and there may have been some validity to the practice. But, after the fact, the idea appears to be flawed.
• A pilot who routinely aims for "brick one" on a clear day will be prone to do so on a poor visibility day. The problem is that the pilot's depth perception is affected and aiming for the lights is not a good idea given the lights are positioned before the runway.
• In the GCA transcripts you do not see a phrase used quite a bit in training and part of the GCA controller's lexicon: "Too low for safe approach, go around." I think this call would have been appropriate when the pilots called "we have the lights" but would have been unusual because the controller had probably seen this kind of glide path control before and the pilots always made it work before. It isn't the controller's fault, it is the system that tolerates it.
• I believe a part of the report that was redacted is of the terrain just prior to the runway. I flew into Shemya several times and remember a steep upslope to the runway. The impact short of the runway was like flying into a bit of a cliff. There were more than a few Air Force runways back them with tire prints on the first part of the runway overrun, the result of an airplane touching down nearly 1,000 feet short of the runway at 1,700 feet short of the touchdown zone. (There were 18 wheels prints in the overrun at Andrews AFB for a number of years which could only have been made by one kind of airplane.)

I do not agree with the board's findings. Their causal findings say what happened, not why. If I were to write the findings, I would say:

1. The Air Force failed to emphasize the need to land in the touchdown zone to training and standardization programs.
2. The Strategic Air Command failed to consider the risks of flying long training missions prior to landings in poor weather at a very demanding location.
3. The 6th Strategic Wing failed to institute stronger approach protocols for the PAR into Shemya, requiring directed go arounds when well below glide path. The wing further failed to adequate train pilots for Shemya-unique operations and failed to screen pilots adequately for relevant experience prior to upgrade to aircraft commander.

I mentioned earlier that I think there is a lesson here for "us all." What I mean by the word "all" goes beyond pilots, but especially to those in charge of training, checking, and supervising pilots. It also pertains to those paying the bills and instilling onto those pilots the idea that they need to get the job done, no matter the circumstances.

The duck under

The crux of this accident is the practice of the "duck under," the act of intentionally flying below the glide path in an attempt to spot the runway early in bad weather or to somehow land the airplane as close to the end of the runway as possible. The Air Force Mishap Report failed to correctly identify the true cause of this crash. If I were writing the report, the first cause would read as follows:

Before this report was widely disseminated, I was flying an EC-135J out of Hickam AFB, Hawaii that had the same engines and about the same approach and landing speeds. We we trained to land in the first 500 feet of the runway, contrary to then existing regulations. When the report was briefed to us, we stopped doing that for a while. For the next ten years, I flew for two other wings in two different commands that reverted to the duck under. The accident report doesn't mention this.

Years later, a family member of one of the pilots forwarded me legal testimony in an Air Force proceeding where the following exchange took place between a board member and one of the navigators on the accident aircraft. This navigator had over three years experience with this operation.

Later, in the same proceedings, from another navigator:

The Air Force pilot "can do" attitude

Having read sworn testimony from the aircraft commander of this accident flight, I was struck by three things. First, the pilot was highly knowledgeable in some areas, but not all areas required to fly in such a demanding environment. Second, the pilot was forthright in his answers and honest about personal shortcomings that had been previously documented, such as for failed checkrides. Third, that the pilot was confident in his abilities.

With the benefit of hindsight, it would be easy to say that confidence wasn't justified. But that misses a key point in the Air Force pilot mindset. We are placed in hugely difficult situations at early ages and without that confidence, our chances of success diminish. As trite as it may sound, you have to believe before you can do. It is up to the command to ensure pilots are prepared and ready. Once trained, pilots have to believe. I flew a similar airplane into Shemya three times in much nicer weather. All three approaches were stressful. But I believed.

USAF Mishap Report, RC-135S SN 61-2664, Shemya AFB, AK, 15 Mar 1981, Redacted version obtained through Freedom of Information Act filed 7 Dec 2018.