Startle Response

We've seen that simulator experience for many pilots is utterly useless when it comes to combating startle response. You know you are walking away from the smoldering electrons; there is no real risk. What about classroom exercises followed by the simulator? I think that may help you for the exercise, but doubt the exercise has any long lasting impact. So are we doomed to panic if we are naturally inclined to panic? Maybe, but I think you can adopt a training regime to desensitize yourself to any startle response.

1 — Definition

2 — Examples

3 — How the USAF and USN "train out" startle response

4 — How to train yourself "out" of startle response

While definitions vary, they all pretty much boil down to this: Startle response (or reflex or factor, etc.) is an involuntary response to a sudden or threatening stimuli. It is a neurological and physiological reaction that bypasses the brain's conscious decision making process. Some will tell you it is rare in pilots, but I think it more likely that most pilots are never presented with the circumstances that would prompt the startle response. But when it happens, the results can be tragic.

You can make an argument that many aviation accidents involve some level of startle response. Why do pilots do things against the way they were trained? Here are just a few that I think are more blatant than others.

Air France 447

Two inexperienced first officers are left in charge of an Airbus A330 over the Atlantic while the captain is on an authorized break from the cockpit. A simple loss of air data caused the autopilot to disengage at 35,000 feet. The loss of air data lasted 29 seconds and the correct answer was to do nothing and keep the aircraft pitch and power set. The first officer flying pulled back on the stick, increasing the pitch to 11° and climbing 2,000 feet and eventually stalling the aircraft. Neither first officer had the experience and composure to simply fly a known attitude and thrust setting. All 240 on board perished.

More about this: Air France 447.

Atlas Air 3591

A Boeing 767 first officer who should had never been hired inadvertently hits the TO/GA button while the aircraft was descending through about 6,000 feet in IMC conditions. He becomes disoriented and is convinced the aircraft is stalling, so he shoves the nose down. The captain is busy with other tasks and takes 20 seconds to figure out what was going on. It was too late. The cargo only aircraft was lost with all three onboard.

More about this: Atlas Air 3591.

British Midlands 092

The captain of the Boeing 737 quickly assessed a compressor stall as coming from the right engine based on his experience with a previous version of the aircraft, ignoring other indications that it was actually the left engine. After they shut down the right engine and the left engine eventually quit, they had no place to go but down. Of the 134 on board, 47 were killed.

More about this: British Midlands 092.

Learjet N999LJ

This Learjet crew was set up by poor tire inflation that led to tire failures during takeoff. We practice the go / no-go decision in the simulator where there are no real risks. When this pilot was faced with that decision in the airplane, she made the decision several times. Had she just made a decision and stuck with it, she would still be alive. Instead, six of the eight occupants died.

More about this: Learjet N999LJ.

Transasia 235

The ATR 72 was climbing nicely with the autopilot engaged when the number 2 engine had a problem, autofeathered itself, and told the crew through the Engine Warning Display that "ENG 2 FLAME OUT AT TAKE OFF" and all the indications that verified that. The Captain disengaged the autopilot and announced that he would pull back the number 1 engine. The first officer said "Wait a second crosscheck" but the throttle was already pulled and the first officer was only too content to complete the shutdown of the wrong engine. Of the 58 on board, only 43 survived.

More about this: Transasia 235.

United Airlines 1722

The first officer selected the wrong flap setting after takeoff while the captain was worried about weather avoidance. When the airspeed tape didn't reflect the limitations for the expected flap setting, the captain tried to figure it all out without prioritizing flying the airplane. A combination of factors resulted in the pitch decreasing to the point the Boeing 777 was headed downhill with a -10° pitch. The GPWS activated and the crew managed to dish out the dive 748' above the water, saving themselves and the 279 on board. Something as simple as an unexpected flap setting caused the captain to forget the prime directive of flight: someone has to actively fly the airplane.

More about this: United Airlines 1722

Is there a solution to startle response? I believe there is and that solution has been used with great success for a very long time. But this solution requires grabbing the pilot early and treating them very badly for a sustained period. Sound crazy? Maybe. Please consider my pilot training experience as an example of how we Air Force and Navy pilots learn to fly.

• From Day Two and on in our "basic" phase we started with a blank sheet of paper where we were tasked with writing all the immediate actions in the Cessna T-37B, verbatim. In 1979, the immediate actions were called "Bold Face" because they appeared in bold print in the flight manual. That year, we had 10 such bold face procedures, totaling 29 steps.

We had to reproduce this list in the correct order with the correct punctuation, no exceptions. Failure meant that day's flying was canceled for you and more training was dictated. I once failed because I got the ejection procedure wrong:

1. HANDGRIPS - RAISE

2. TRIGGERS - SQUEEZE

I added a "d" to the first step, turning RAISE to RAISED. Poor showing, lieutenant, you thought you were flying today, but you aren't.

• Everyday on the flight line began with "stand up." After all the students and instructors were assembled, the most sadistic instructor would call upon a random student to stand at attention. Here's one of my best showings:

Captain Sadist: "Lieutenant Albright, you are solo in the practice area on the top of a loop, inverted. The airplane is almost out of airspeed but the nose is coming down nicely and there is no doubt in your military mind that you will be coming home tonight to your lovely bride, having flown yet another successful solo in the mighty T-37. Suddenly, the right engine fire light illuminates."

Second Lieutenant Me: "Sir, I would roll upright with a slight descent to ensure the aircraft continues in controlled flight. I would ensure the aircraft is headed away from area borders. I would then execute the bold face. THROTTLE - RETARD. FUEL SHUTOFF T-HANDLE - PULL-OFF. THROTTLE - CUT-OFF."

Depending on how you did at stand up, you got one of two responses. "Have a seat," means you passed and can expect to fly that day, go one to graduate, and have a great career. "Sit down," means you are not flying today, will be getting some more ground training, will have to make eye contact with all the instructors who heretofore thought you had potential, had to commiserate with the other student losers for the day, and hope that somehow, the next day you will be permitted another chance.

• Every flight briefing began with an emergency procedure which was less intensive than stand up, since you weren't standing up in front of an audience, but still important because it would determine if your instructor deemed you worthy of the jet fuel the taxpayer was about to invest in you.
• Every checkride involved an adversary, either seated in your cockpit or in the next airplane. These evaluator pilots were selected for their ability to intimidate and for the enjoyment they seemed to get from making others unhappy.

Does this method work? I think so. It has an element of chance since in a large class the odds are you will not be picked for the stand up humiliation. It has an element of risk because you don't know what the challenge is going to be. It has consequences because failing the challenge means you lose a day of flying and gain or add to a reputation for choking under pressure. Finally, it is enduring; it takes place for the duration and pilot training (1 year) and beyond, depending on the aircraft you end up flying.

Undergraduate Pilot Training does come to an end and you and your new wings graduate to more training, more check rides, and more sadistic evaluators. Every step of the way there are consequences and the price of failure can be loss of your position in the hierarchy, your next promotion, your wings, or even your officership. The entire process numbs you to the startle. Does it work? I think it does. My first engine failure at V₁ was on my last checkride during Undergraduate Pilot Training. We were taking off on a runway barely long enough for the Northrop T-38 and ingested a duck. The fireball was so violent that it exploded forward of the airplane. After dealing with that, I came back around for a single-engine landing while considering the aircraft's trajectory if we had to eject. (The aircraft could not be dead sticked to landing with both engines out.) During this and the many engine failures and other emergency procedures to follow, there was no startle. I believe you can train out startle response. But it takes a long time and effort to do that.

Specialized courses or added interest items during recurrent?

There have been studies and other attempts to train pilots to deal with startle response. For example: Training for Startle, FlightSafety Foundation. I suppose any effort to train is better than no effort, but I am not sure these methods are sufficient. In some of these attempts, pilots are made aware of the problem in a classroom, given several simulator exercises where there will be a surprise at some point. Those with the classroom do marginally better than those without and the scientists pat themselves on their backs and say job done. I don't think so. These startle students are in an academic environment with no risk or threat of consequences.

I've also attended five day recurrent classes where we are told that during one of three simulator session, we will be given something that we aren't expecting. But that's never worked for me, since I take it for granted that this is going to happen. (The element of chance is assumed.) I suppose there is some risk, since the number of possible scenarios is only limited by the instructor's imagination. But many of these instructors have no imagination, so the risk depends on the instructor. The consequences are minimal, since you will probably be flying with someone outside your organization and any humiliation will not follow you. The biggest problem is that all of this takes place during one of three simulators. Once its done, you are unlikely to do it again. (In my case, the simulator vendor lost interest in it and I never had to do this after the first time.)

A better idea

What if you don't have a background in Air Force or Navy pilot training? Or what if your Air Force or Navy background happened during one of their periods of being more sensitive and adverse to the traditional fear, sarcasm, and ridicule instructor techniques? I think the key to the way we did it in the Air Force and Navy many years ago is that: (1) We were expected to be calm under pressure, (2) We were openly mocked if we weren't, and (3) We worked very hard at making the aircraft an extension of ourselves. You can adopt these practices even if you've been flying for a very long time. (But the more set in your ways, the harder this will be.) You might consider the following startle response desensitization program.

Note: I fully realize that in today's culture where hurting someone's feeling can be considered a capital offense, putting someone on the spot as I suggest will be thought of as going too far. I think the Air Force might have stopped "stand up" the way we used to do it, for this very reason. So if you decide to do something like this, you might try a "kinder and gentler" version.

The set up

For the first day of every trip, have both pilots prepare a scenario from the emergency procedures section of your manuals designed to require quick decision making. For example: "Passing the final approach fix returning to our home base, the right engine fire light illuminates."

Prior to any pilot meetings, do the same thing, but have every pilot prepare a scenario.

The element of chance

For the pre-trip "stand up," both pilots are prepared to give the question, but don't know if they will be the person put on the spot. Select a method to make the choice: flip a coin, draw high cards from a deck, rock-paper-scissors, or something of the sort. Only the "winner" is put on the hot seat.

For the pilot meeting, you will also draw cards or come up with a similar method of choosing a single pilot to be put on the spot.

The element of risk

Each pilot designing a challenge keeps the details secret. Whomever gets the challenge, will have no idea until the time comes.

Consequences

It may be useful to require the person in the hot seat to stand up, singling that person out. With the pilot meeting, you could also have the person seated on one side of a table while everyone else is on the other side. The point is to make the selectee uncomfortable.

The person posing the question, or the group, will pass judgment. "Good job, have a seat" or "not what we had in mind, sit down and let's talk it through."

Enduring

I always found that when I was the person on the hot seat, even if I got it wrong, I tended to better understand the scenario and was inspired to study harder. It is important to keep this up for a while, not just a one-month trial period.

Example "stand up"

The objective is to put the person standing up (SU) under some pressure. There is a bit of an art for the questioner (Q) to give only enough information as would happen during an actual scenario. For example:

Q: "You are returning to our home airport, on an ILS, and the autopilot and autothrottles are coupled and the aircraft is fully configured, on speed. Just after intercepting the glide path, the Crew Alerting System gives you an "R ENG OUT" message. What do you do?"

SU: "I would ensure the aircraft is continuing on the glide path and remains stable."

Q: "Who is flying the airplane?"

SU: "I would continue to fly the aircraft and direct the first officer to tell me what he sees."

Q: "The first officer says you are crabbing to right. You both hear a double chime and the first officer announces that the autothrottles have disengaged and you are falling below your target approach speed."

SU: "I would add left rudder to zero the yaw, add left throttle to correct the airspeed, and ask the first officer about the engine."

Q: "The first officer says nice job on taking care of the yaw and speed, and also that the left engine is now at windmilling RPM, there are no signs of fire, and recommends you attempt a relight."

SU: "I'll tell the first officer to ensure the before landing checklist is complete, that we'll continue the approach, land, and deal with the engine after we land."

Q: "The first officer says that's a good plan, but says a better plan would be to go missed approach and run the engine failure checklist."

SU: "How's our fuel, the weather, the airport, and the runway?"

Q: "Enough fuel to hold for an hour, clear and a million, open all day, and dry."

SU: "I'll tell the first officer I like his idea, and we'll go hold and run the checklist."

Q: "I agree. Please have a seat and we can discuss further if you like."

Note: With some aircraft, provided you have excellent systems knowledge, the right answer here might be to land immediately. With others, in this scenerio there are other steps to complete before landing. In either case, systems knowledge is vital.

The art of remaining calm

Our practical experience tells us that some people handle stress better than others and that remaining calm under pressure is something you either have or don't. I'm not so sure. But since you are in an occupation that really requires you to be calm under pressure, you need to develop this skill if you don't have it. But how?

Step One: Become a Subject Matter Expert (SME). I think the greatest source of stress in a cockpit is fear of the unknown. One of the few things you can train to know, that you didn't already know, is your airplane and the various rules and regulations.

While in Air Force pilot training I failed one formation flight because I didn't know the airplane as well as I should have. I was solo rejoining on lead when I lost a considerable amount of speed. The nozzle on the back of the engine had failed full open, meaning it wouldn't close as needed for the engine to produced thrust. At the time I thought it was only used for the afterburner, which I wasn't using at the time. To say that I was confused would be an understatement. Formation protocol says that the emergency aircraft becomes lead, so I led the formation back to our base. I was so bothered by the engine nozzle that I missed a visual landmark and flew the formation through the wrong pattern. Oops. The lesson is obvious: know your airplane.

Years later, flying a Boeing 707 (EC-135J) from Dallas to Hawaii, we lost all our hydraulic systems. Most of the flight crew had earlier experiences in the KC-135A tanker, which had a somewhat different hydraulic system. The copilot and navigator became very agitated. They thought they would have to manually crank down the gear and flaps, something they had to do once in the tanker during training. That training was done in a tightly timed scenario. I knew that in our aircraft the emergency gear extension was activated by a switch in the cockpit that unlocked the gear and allowed it to free fall. The flaps were driven by an electrical motor. After we landed, the copilot asked me how I managed to keep calm with no hydraulics three hours from the nearest land. I told him the where didn't matter. The knowledge of how was invaluable.

Making the airplane an extension of ourselves

The more at home you are in the cockpit, the better. If you don't know where something is, the feeling of panic can start as you look and fail to find. I think it takes years to develop this level of comfort, so the most dangerous time for many of us is when getting acclimated to a new type. Having spent most of my career as an instructor, I was often amused when someone new to the type discovered something they should have known earlier. Most of the examples of this seem rather silly. But when the pressure is on, this level of comfort can go a long way in making you calm when all others have panicked.

Here's a silly example. The Gulfstream G450 was the first Gulfstream that I had flown that displays an extended centerline to your intended runway with mile markers. We call these "bread crumbs" because they lead you to the runway. I find these to be extremely useful during a visual approach. Because I was previously typed in the GV, my learning curve wasn't as steep as the other pilots in my flight department. After flying the aircraft for nearly a year, one of the pilots said, "hey, did you know there are miles to go markers on that blue line leading to the runway?" Little things like that go a long way when it comes to remaining calm when the pressure is on.

The case for adult supervision

I flew two versions of the aircraft used to back up Air Force One: a Boeing 747 known as the E-4B, and a version of the Gulfstream III called the C-20C. We had the Boeing 747 about ten years before the primary guys did. When Air Force One got their own 747s, the plan at Andrews AFB was to take the pilots flying the 707, train them in the 747, and call it done. The White House reacted in horror and said they would not put the President on board unless one of the pilots or an instructor pilot was onboard who had at least 1,000 hours as PIC in type. At the time, I only had 750 hours and didn't get the job. But one of our guys did and was in a pilot's seat whenever the President was on board for three years. Over the years, I've come to appreciate this wisdom. In the business jet world, it takes forever to get 1,000 hours as PIC in type and most operators don't want to pay for an experienced instructor for more than a week, if at all.

When we bought our GVII, Gulfstream gave us an instructor pilot and maintenance team for five days. We flew a lot to get as much experience as we could, as fast as possible. Was it enough? No. Over the years we've used FlightSafety International simulator instructors for this purpose, but few had relevant experience and we decided this was not a good option. Another option is to hire a pilot with considerable experience in type. We couldn't do that in the GVII because the airplane was so new that nobody had relevant experience. I recommend that until you have enough experience in type, stay close to home where you can get help, and use higher weather minimums.

Is the ability to remain calm under pressure perishable?

I used to think you are either born with it or not. But after a year in Air Force pilot training where we lost a few airplanes, I came to appreciate you can learn this skill. I also used to think once you developed this skill you keep it. My first civilian job taught me this isn't true.

We had two pilots flying from Africa to Brazil in a Challenger 604. The PIC was an Air Force veteran of the B-58 Hustler, an airplane known for killing its crews. The SIC was an Army helicopter gun ship pilot, with combat experience. You would think they would be invulnerable to stress. But they weren't. The part of the Atlantic they were crossing was fairly narrow but while still over-water, they were told the runway at their destination was closed. What to do? The dynamic duo hadn't bothered to file an alternate, since the weather was good. Neither had experience in Brazil. The rest of our pilots knew intuitively what to do, but these two pilots panicked. The yelling and cursing from the cockpit unnerved the passengers. The PIC was asked to retire. I suspect his panic was due to a lack of knowledge about his airplane's capability and the geographic area. Neither pilot was an SME on the airplane or international procedures. Our flight department was filled with pilots who were SMEs on both topics. The lesson: even if you are a naturally calm pilot, you need to know your stuff.

Why do any of this?

Starting an Air Force style "stand up" program in a civilian flight department may seem extreme, and maybe it is. In fact, I've heard that the Air Force has become "kinder and gentler" and considers much of this off limits hazing. So why do I offer this as an option?

I think this is a worthwhile thought experiment to help you consider options for making yourself and those you fly with regularly less prone to a startle response when things get ugly very quickly.

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